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Abstract—Despite the plethora of studies about security vulnerabilities and defenses of deep
learning models, security aspects of deep learning methodologies, such as transfer learning,
have been rarely studied. In this article, we highlight the security challenges and research
opportunities of these methodologies, focusing on vulnerabilities and attacks unique to them.
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W ith the widespread adaptation of deep neural
networks (DNN), their security challenges have
received significant attention from both academia
and industry, especially for mission critical ap-
plications, such as road sign detection for au-
tonomous vehicles, face recognition in authenti-
cation systems, and fraud detection in financial
systems.
There are three major types of attacks on deep
learning models, namely adversarial attacks, data
poisoning, and exploratory attacks. Particularly,
adversarial attacks, which aim to carefully craft
inputs that cause the model to misclassify, has
been extensively studied and many defence mech-
anisms have been proposed to alleviate them.
These attacks are of paramount importance be-
cause they are effective, moderately simple to
launch, and often transferable from one model
to another. In literature, there are several survey
and review papers on deep learning security and
defence mechanisms. In this article, we focus on
security of a much less explored area of machine
learning - machine learning methodologies.
Machine learning methodologies have been
widely used to mitigate the restrictions and as-
sumptions of a typical machine learning pro-
cess. A typical DNN training process assumes
large labeled dataset(s), access to high computa-
tional resources, non-private and centralized data,
standard training and hyper-parameter tuning,
and fixed task distribution over time. However,
these assumptions are often difficult to realize in
practice. As a result, different machine learning
methodologies have been developed and adopted,
such as transfer learning, federated learning,
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model compression, multi-task learning, meta-
learning, and lifelong learning. Notwithstand-
ing the proliferation of these machine learning
methodologies, their security aspects have not
been comprehensively analyzed, if ever studied.
In this article, we focus on potential attacks,
security vulnerabilities, and future directions spe-
cific to each learning methodology. Note that
there are many more machine learning method-
ologies in literature, including few-shot learning,
on-device learning, zero-shot learning, to name
but a few. However, due to the lack of space and
the fact that these methodologies mostly overlap
with the ones that we review, we limit our dis-
cussion to the aforementioned methodologies. We
assume that readers have rudimentary background
on deep neural networks and how they work.
Background
Attack Taxonomy
In machine learning security, an attack has a
threat model that defines the goal, capabilities (or
knowledge), and target model. The attacker’s goal
can be categorized in terms of security violation:
1) violation of availability that aims to reduce
the confidence of a model for normal inputs, 2)
violation of integrity that aims misclassification
on certain inputs without affecting normal inputs,
and 3) violation of privacy that aims to obtain
confidential information about the model, training
or inference-time data and users, or even hyper-
parameters used during training (hyper-parameter
stealing attack).
The life-cycle of a typical machine learn-
ing model with offline training data consists of
training and inference phases, which indicate
attacker’s capabilities and knowledge. Training
phase capabilities are data injection, where the
attacker injects new data points to the training
dataset, data poisoning, where the attacker modi-
fies the existing data points in the training dataset,
and logic corruption, where the attacker interferes
with the learning algorithm.
In the inference phase, the model is assumed
to be fixed and the attacker cannot change the
model. However, the attacker can still craft data
inputs that fool the model to provide incorrect
outputs. Hence, the attacker’s capability is defined
based on how much information she has about the
model, ranging from white-box, where everything
is possibly known including the entire model
and training data, to black-box attacks, where
minimum knowledge about the model, training
data and algorithm is known. Any attack model
that lays between while-box and black-box attack
in terms of available information about the model
is called gray-box attack.
Attack Types
In machine learning security, attacks are often
categorized into three attack types based on the
threat model:
Evasion attack (adversarial attack): The
goal of an evasion attack is to manipulate the
input data such that the model misclassifies. Al-
though one can technically manipulate training
data using evasion attack methods during training
phase (often for adversarial retraining as a de-
fense mechanism), evasion attack is an inference
phase attack that violates the integrity. Figure
1(a) illustrates the adversarial attack where the
attacker add a small perturbation, imperceptible
to human eye, to the stop sign image to cause the
model to misclassify.
Data poisoning: This is a training phase
attack where the attacker inject or manipulate
training data to either create a backdoor to use at
inference time (without compromising the model
performance on normal input data) or to cor-
rupt the training process. Hence, it can violate
availability or integrity depending on the goal. A
typical example is to create a backdoor for face
recognition task where the attacker injects a set
of training samples with a specific object in a
target person’s training data. The aim is to force
the model to associate the specific object with the
target class. Then, any face image with the object
is classified as the target class even if it belongs
to another person. For instance, in Figure 1(c),
the attacker inject faces of John with a special
hat during training. Then, at the inference phase,
any face that has the hat is classified as John by
the model.
Exploratory attacks: The aim of the attack is
to violate the privacy at inference phase. It covers
several types of attacks, including model extrac-
tion, to extract model parameters, membership
inference attack, to examine whether a data point
is used during the training phase, model inversion,
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Figure 1. Typical attacks on machine learning: (a) Adversarial attack, (b) model inversion attack, and (c)
backdoor attack.
to infer something about input by observing the
model output. In Figure 1(b), the attacker aims
to recover the input image of Mia by observing
the output and the model. Although exploratory
attacks have been widely studied for classical
machine learning algorithms, there are only a
few work on deep learning models. For example,
it has been recently shown that sensitive and
out-of-distribution sentences, such as ”My social
security is —-”, can be leaked from commercial
text-completion neural networks [12].
Machine Learning Methodologies
Several machine learning methodologies, such
as tranfer learning or multi-task learning, have
been used to train better models, reduce train-
ing data, reduce model complexity, distribute
resources, or use other training data or models.
These methodologies may overlap or have simi-
larities. However, each methodology is based on
different set of assumptions that may introduce
different vulnerabilities. Here, we briefly explain
the assumptions and goals of each machine learn-
ing methodology:
Transfer learning: Transfer learning refers
to techniques that use the knowledge learned for
one task, called the source task, to improve the
performance of another task, called the target
task. The model trained for the source task is
called the teacher model and the model trained
for the target task is called the student model. The
most common way of transfer learning for deep
learning models is to transfer all/some weights of
a teacher model to a student model and then train
the student model for the target task. The intuition
is that the teacher model’s weights are much
closer to the local optimum for the target task than
any random initialization of the student model.
Hence, the training procedure of the model for
the target task starts at the point where it is
considerably close to the performance target of
the training procedure.
Multi-task learning: The goal of multi-task
learning is to learn several related tasks simulta-
neously. The most prevalent multi-task learning
approach for deep models is parameter sharing,
where the model consists of shared layers and
task-specific layers. An example of multi-task
learning is to predict the class and the coordinates
of an object in an image.
Federated learning: Federated learning (FL)
is a distributed learning approach that aims to
train a model on a distributed private data. The
assumption is that data is distributed among nodes
capable of training a model, such as smartphone
devices, and there is a centralized server that co-
ordinates the training. The main approach consists
of several training rounds where the server sends
the model to a set of nodes. Then, these nodes
train the model with all or a portion of their local
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dataset and send the updates back to the server.
Then, at the end of each round, the server receives
all the updates from the nodes and aggregates
them to built a new model. The advantage of
federated learning is that contributing nodes do
not need to share or reveal their training data.
Model compression: The aim of model com-
pression is to make large deep models suitable
for devices with limited resources (e.g. CPU,
memory, energy, bandwidth). The two common
compression approaches are pruning that reduces
the number of parameters of models, and quan-
tisation that reduces the number of bits required
to store each parameter. Although compression
methods try to keep the model accuracy intact on
the training data, the compressed model may act
completely different from the original model on
unseen or adversarial inputs.
Meta-learning: Meta-learning is the process
of better learning a task from past experiences
and other tasks with the purpose of learning
much faster, inspired by how humans learn. Meta-
learning has been proliferated in the past two
decades. Different categories and approaches of
meta-learning is out of the scope of this paper.
Avid readers can find several recent surveys on
this topic. Note that meta-learning may overlap
much with other methodologies, including trans-
fer learning, few-shot learning, and multi-task
learning. However, in this article, we consider
broader and general categories of meta-learning.
Lifelong machine learning: The ability to
continually learn new tasks by building upon pre-
viously learned knowledge and tasks over time,
which is an indispensable part of humans and
animals life, is called lifelong learning. In lifelong
learning, the system should retain its ability to
perform older tasks and learn new tasks. lifelong
learning has been studied for decades and the
most difficult challenge is the catastrophic for-
getting, which refers to the inability of models to
perform old tasks as accurate as new tasks over
time.
Attacks on Deep Learning
Methodologies
Transfer Learning
The most common form of transfer learning
(TL) is to transfer the first n layers of the teacher
model to the student model, add a few layers
Feature Extractor Classifier
Teacher Model
Student Model
Person A
Internal features of Person A 
Internal features of Person B 
Person B
Small 
perturbation
Internal features of Person B +  perturbation
+ Person A
Person A
Attacker
User
Figure 2. An adversarial attack on TL. The attacker
that has the teacher model can use the feature ex-
tractor of the model to craft a small perturbation that
changes the internal feature of the person B to be
similar to that of person A.
at the end of the model, and retrain the student
model with a new dataset. As shown in Figure
2, the part transferred from the teacher model is
called feature extractor and the new layers are
called classifier. The feature extractor provides
the high level representation of the input, such
as the existence of certain objects in object de-
tection, some frequencies and patterns in voice
detection, etc.
The main vulnerability of TL methods stems
from the fact the teacher models are often pub-
licly available and known. Hence, even in the
black-box scenario, an attacker can easily obtain
the feature extractor part of the student model. It
is shown that even if the entire student model is
retrained with a new dataset, the feature extractor
part is still close to the teacher’s feature extractor
[3]. Furthermore, an attacker can manipulate the
original teacher model and create a backdoor on
it and upload it as a valid version of the teacher
model.
In literature, three studies developed strong
attacks on TL. All the attacks assume white-box
access to the teacher model, but black-box access
to the student model. In [3], authors discuss
that if two input images share similar internal
representation, the classifier likely classifies them
as the same class. Hence, they use the feature
extractor from the teacher model to craft a small
perturbation for the source input to be classified
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as another class. As shown in Figure 2, one can
add a small perturbation to person B’s image to
fool the student model to classify it as person
A. The optimization formulations used to craft
adversarial inputs in all studies for machine learn-
ing strategies are similar to the formulation in
attacks on deep models. Hence, we do not cover
the optimization formulation in this article.
Similar approach has also been used in [2]
in a form of data poisoning attack. They craft
a set of adversarial images with similar internal
features to the internal features of an attack target
class. Then, they retrain the teacher model with
the crafted images to create a backdoor. Hence,
any student model that uses the poisoned model
as a teacher is likely prone to the backdoor. It
is challenging to detect models with backdoors
since their behavior to the normal input is similar
to the original model. Detecting backdoors of
machine learning models is still an open problem.
In [4], the authors introduce a target-agnostic
attack that does not need any sample input of the
target class to trigger it. They show that even if
one does not know the typical internal features
of the target class for natural data, one can still
trigger the Softmax layer with high probability.
They argue that since the Softmax layer performs
linear operation on the feature extractor, numer-
ous internal features can produce the same output
on the Softmax layer as the internal features of
the target class have. Hence, they introduce a
mechanism that attempts to craft images that has
a very large value on one of the internal features.
Such crafted images likely trigger the class that
assigns a higher weight to that feature. This attack
is even useful on systems that no input sample
is available to the attacker, such as identifica-
tion/authentication systems. However, they show
that this target-agnostic attack can be defended
by using a more sophisticated classifier that takes
the distributional pattern of internal features into
account, not just the linear combination.
Exploratory attacks are generally harder for
deep learning models due to their complexity.
There is no study on exploratory attack specif-
ically for TL so far. However, due to the fact that
the feature extractor part of the model is known
to the attacker, exploratory attacks may be even
easier. For instance, the model extraction attack,
that aims to extract the entire model parameters,
needs to only find the parameters of the classifier
part. So, the search space is significantly smaller
than the entire model parameters.
The main assumption that enables such at-
tacks is that the teacher model is known and
the feature extractor of the student model is not
significantly different than the teacher model.
Hence, the most effective mechanism that can
potentially prevent all these attacks is to make
a considerable change to the feature extractor
so that it becomes different from the publicly
available one. Unfortunately, the typical retrain-
ing process of a student model does not change
the feature extractor significantly. Hence, in [3],
they suggest a retraining optimization formulation
with a constraint that forces the distance between
the student feature extractor and the teacher’s one
to be higher than a threshold. Such an approach
can reduce the chance of successful attack on
TL. However, it increases the retraining time
and requires the input samples and labels of the
original teacher model.
Federated Learning
Federated learning (FL) allows several par-
ticipants to train a joint model using their local
private data. As it is shown in Figure 3, FL con-
sists of several rounds in which the shared model
parameters are sent to a set of participants. Then,
each participant updates the model parameters by
training the model on a subset of local private data
and send the parameter updates back to the server.
Finally, the server aggregates all the updates and
updates the shared model. The number of papers
about security vulnerabilities and defences of FL
methodology is disproportionally large compared
to other methodologies. In this section, we briefly
introduce the security vulnerabilities and defense
types, and encourage readers to follow the refer-
ences and related papers for more details.
As shown in Figure 3, a model in a FL
methodology has three components from which
an attack can be launched: 1) the participants,
2) the server, and 3) the end user. The end user
does not participate in training and can only query
the shared model. The end user can essentially
perform any evasion and exploratory attack that
he can launch on general deep models. As far as
security is concerned, FL does not open up any
additional vulnerability that the end user can ex-
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Figure 3. Federated learning components and training procedure.
ploit. Hence, the evasion and exploratory attacks
and defenses on deep models apply directly in FL
on the end user side.
The separation of updating server from data
introduces more security challenges and attacks.
A participant can launch data poisoning or back-
door attack and it is much harder to defend
against for two reasons: 1) It is much easier for
an attacker to inject and provide data in FL than
any other learning strategy by impersonating a
participant, and 2) it is much harder for a server
to detect poisoned data because it does not have
access to the local private data. It is shown that an
attacker can can cause the shared model to reach
100% accuracy on the backdoor task in only a
single round [5]. Such attacks target integrity of
the shared model and it is difficult to defend
because the server only observes the parameter
updates from participants.
In addition to data poisoning and backdoor
attack, a participant can also launch exploratory
attacks. For instance, it has been shown that a
malicious participant can recover a victim partic-
ipant’s data by training a Generative Adversarial
Network (GAN) that generates instances similar
to the training data [14]. This attack is possi-
ble because the attacker can update the model
weights such that it forces the model to be more
over-fitted to the victim’s data at each round. The
GAN model is trained at each round and grad-
ually learns the distribution of the victim’s data.
Although exploratory attacks are often known to
be effective on over-fitted models, it has been
shown that a non-over-fitted model is still prone
to generalized membership inference attack [15].
Model extraction attack is trivial in FL because
the model is already shared with participants.
The third component of FL is the server. Note
that the most paramount goal of FL is to provide
privacy of the participants’ local data. Hence, an
interesting question arises regarding the data pri-
vacy: Can the server recover participants’ private
data only using parameter updates? Due to the
separation of training data and updating server,
this attack is unique to FL. In this case, the
server is assumed honest-but-curious, that is, the
server executes the pre-designed training process
honestly but may aim to learn or infer private
user information. Several papers introduced novel
ways to partially recover local private data from
participants updates. For instance, if a participant
computes the parameter updates using only a sin-
gle training sample, the server can easily recover
the local training data [13].
The defences against an attacker on end user-
side is similar to any defense on general deep
learning models and are not unique in FL. What
is unique is defence mechanisms to protect pri-
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vacy of participants’ data (against an attacker
on server-side or other participants) or integrity
of the shared model (against an attacker on
participant-side). All defense mechanisms pro-
posed so far present a trade-off among privacy,
integrity, computational resources and communi-
cation overhead. It is not known whether there
is a practical defence mechanism that protects
privacy and integrity, and achieve high accuracy
or converge in a reasonable time at the same time
and much research is needed. In the remained of
this section, we discuss defence mechanisms for
privacy and integrity separately.
Defence mechanisms for privacy: There are
three main approaches to preserve privacy in FL
setting: 1) differential privacy, 2) homomorphic
encryption, and 3) Secure Multi-party Compu-
tation (SMC). Differential privacy is the most
widely used privacy-preserving approach due to
its simplicity and theoretical guarantees. The goal
of differential privacy is to ensure that the out-
put distribution of the model around a training
sample is not too much different from the output
distribution of the exact training sample. Over-
fitted models that lack generalizability suffer from
this overfitting issue and can be a target of the
membership inference attack. The most common
approach to guarantee differential privacy is to
add small random noise to training data samples.
It is also possible to add a random noise to the
update parameters obtained by participants [8].
However, there is a trade-off between privacy
and accuracy. Increasing the noise value increases
the privacy, but it may significantly degrade the
accuracy.
The second privacy-preserving approach is
homomorphic encryption. Homomorphic encryp-
tion allows certain operations on encrypted data
in such a way that when decrypted, the results
match the results of performing the same op-
eration on the unencrypted data. Homomorphic
encryption can be used in two different ways:
First, participant can encrypt their data with
homomorphic encryption [11] and then perform
the federated learning as with unencrypted data.
In this scenario, even if the malicious server
recover a participant’s data from the parameters
update, it is encrypted and the server cannot
decrypt it. However, homomorphic encryption
increases computational overhead and also needs
polynomial approximation of non-linear functions
(such as activation functions), which results in a
trade-off between privacy and accuracy. Second,
participants can use homomorphic encryption to
encrypt their updates. In this case, the server
does not have the unencrypted updates to recover
the participant’s data during the training phase.
However, studies that propose using homomor-
phic encryption on weight updates, such as [13],
use the server as a storage during training. One
practical issue with this approach is that the server
cannot query the model to observe the progress
of the training. Moreover, it is not suitable for
the online learning scenario where the model is
needed to be used during the training and training
is an ongoing process. In such cases, if the
unencrypted model is continuously revealed to the
server for it to use, it eventually neutralizes the
goal of using encrypted weight updates. In such
cases, the homomorphic encryption acts similar
to SMC, explained in the next paragraph.
The third privacy preserving approach is Se-
cure Multi-party Computation (SMC) [7]. Simply
put, SMC allows several participants to aggregate
their update in a secure way such that the server
can only obtain the aggregated updates. Without
the exact update of a participant, the server cannot
use update to recover local private data. However,
SMC cannot still protect the model from infor-
mation leakage. If the model is inherently prone
to data leakage, the attacker does not need indi-
vidual weight updates. For instance, Hitaj et al.
[14] proposed a Generative Adversarial Network
(GAN) model that can recover training samples
of participant by actively participating in training
phase. Their approach only needs the shared
model parameters and works even when SMC is
used. The combination of SMC and differential
privacy may provide stronger privacy guarantee.
However, they are not practical for large-scale
scenarios since they incur high computation and
communication costs.
Defence mechanisms for integrity: To
defend against malicious participants, most
commonly-used mechanisms assume that the ma-
jority of participants are honest. Then, they define
a metric based on which they can remove ma-
licious updates, keep the most relevant updates,
choose the best update, find a robust statistic
of the updates, etc. For instance, [9] uses the
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coordinated-wise median of all participant up-
dates to update the shared model weights. Krums
finds the most honest participant at each round
and uses its update [10]. There are several similar
approaches that are out of the scope of this article.
However, the most important limitation of those
approaches is that they implicitly assume an i.i.d.
distribution of data among participants which is
unrealistic in FL [5]. The impact of non-i.i.d data
distribution among participants and how it may
affect the detection of malicious updates needs
further investigation. Moreover, the performance
impact of these approaches where certain number
of updates are ignored needs more research. For
example, in reality, the number of malicious par-
ticipants maybe considerably smaller than honest
participants. Hence, ignoring a large number of
updates, for instance when Krums is used, may
degrade the performance and deter fast conver-
gence. Furthermore, certain attacks, such as the
backdoor attack, can easily train the local model
with similar data distribution as other honest
participants and conceal their true purpose. As
a result, more research is needed to ensure the
integrity of FL.
The privacy and integrity aspects of FL seem
to be irreconcilable. All current widely-used
defences against data poisoning requires unen-
crypted and unaggregated updates of each par-
ticipant, making them prone to privacy leakage
attacks. On the other hand, all defence mecha-
nisms to preserve privacy manipulate the updates
substantially, except for homomorphic encryption
on input data, which makes integrity defences
useless. To the best of our knowledge, the impact
of using homomorphic encryption of input data
on weight updates are not well studied. Hence, the
weight updates in such cases may be consistent
with the assumption of defences for integrity.
However, even if the combination of these two
achieves good integrity and privacy, the compu-
tation overhead and accuracy degradation is not
negligible. Therefore, more research is needed to
protect the privacy and integrity in FL.
Model Compression
Model compression aims to convert an un-
compressed model to a compressed model. The
attack target can be either the compressed model
or the uncompressed model. If the attack target is
the compressed (uncompressed) model and it is
available to the attacker, either in a form of black-
box or white-box, similar attacks used in deep
learning models can be applied and no specific
attack is needed. Hence, the more interesting
scenario is where an attacker has access to the
compressed (uncompressed) model, but she wants
to launch the attack on the corresponding uncom-
pressed (compressed) version of the model.
There is only one study on the model com-
pression attack. In [1], the authors investigate
the transferability of adversarial crafted image
between compressed and uncompressed models.
They study two compression techniques, namely
pruning and quantisation, and a few well-known
adversarial attacks. Their main observation is that
the adversarial inputs can be transferred between
compressed and uncompressed model although
the attack effectiveness highly depends on the
model, the compression method, and the attack
algorithm. The adversarial inputs are also trans-
ferable between different compressed version of
an uncompressed model. Moreover, increasing the
compression ratio makes it marginally harder to
transfer the adversarial samples.
Since compressed models are often designed
for devices directly accessible to customers such
as smartphones, it is reasonable to assume that
the compressed version is available to an attacker.
Hence, the attacker can potentially attack the
uncompressed model and all other compressed
versions of the model due to the transferability
of adversarial samples. Unfortunately, no defense
mechanism has been proposed yet. Since the
assumptions and the way the attack is launched
is somehow similar to TL attacks, attempts to
change the compressed version of the model dur-
ing compression may reduce the transferability of
adversarial samples.
The attack and defense mechanisms for the
model compression needs further research. For
instance, it is not known whether backdoors
are also transferable between uncompressed and
compressed version. Additionally, the shape of
classification manifold may dramatically change
when compression is applied. This change may
not affect the accuracy of a model on training
data, but it may introduce a new possible set
of adversarial attacks. It may also be possible
for an attacker to meddle the training process
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of the uncompressed model to make it heavily
dependable on all parameters and weights such
that it later prevents any compression method to
effectively work.
Exploratory attacks have not been yet studied
on model compression. Since the compressed
models are usually easy to access from personal
devices, it is interesting to study whether the
uncompressed model can be extracted from the
compressed model. If possible, it would be a
threat to businesses that rely on providing com-
pressed models. Similar to TL where the assump-
tion that feature extractor is available opens new
attacks, the assumption that compressed model is
obtainable may enable more attacks.
Multi-task Learning
Multi-task learning has been widely used to
solve various tasks in image classification, natural
language processing, etc. Even when the goal
of training a model is to perform single task,
we can still train the model for multiple related
auxiliary tasks to improve the learning of the
target task. However, security vulnerabilities and
their potential defense mechanisms have not been
studied yet.
One possible data poisoning attack is to poi-
son the dataset of one task and see if it can
be used to target other tasks. Imagine that a
victim wants to train a model for facial expression
detection. Due to the lack of data, he decides
to define an auxilary task of face recognition
and uses public datasets. An attacker can poison
the public dataset for the auxilary task such that
it creates a set of backdoors on the model on
which it is trained. How to craft images to create
backdoor in this scenario is not a trivial question.
If an attacker has access to the model, ei-
ther black-box or white-box, general adversarial
attacks on single task models work on multi-
task models as well. However, the multi-task
model may expose new attacks to the model. For
instance, lets assume steering direction prediction
in self-driving car. A victim may define an aux-
iliary task of classifying road characteristic and
type. Now, since the model is trained on both
tasks that are related, the classification output
of the road characteristic task probably has a
direct relation with the output of steering direc-
tion prediction task. By querying the model with
different road characteristics, the attacker can find
the relationship between these tasks. Although the
attacker may not know how to change the input
to change the output of the steering direction
task, he can change the input to have certain road
characteristic that affects the steering prediction
task. In other words, an interesting question is
that how we can use task A to craft an adversarial
input targeting task B, if task A is easier to craft
adversarial inputs for. For example, the attacker
may have access to a dataset for A, but not for task
B. There are several possible attacks, including
exploratory attacks, and potential defenses that
are not explored yet.
Meta-learning
In the most general form, we are interested
in finding a model or recommender, called meta-
learner, that outputs a good model or parameters
for a new task. For instance, in the transfer
learning approach, the meta learner should find
the most similar task to the target task and give
the suitable pre-trained model. To build such a
meta-learner, we often need meta-data describing
previous tasks, including model architecture and
parameters, learning algorithms, and evaluation
results. In other words, an entire dataset for task
A and an instance of a model that is trained on the
dataset is just a single meta-data point for meta-
learner. Meta-learner can either recommends a
good starting point for training a model for the
new task or it can actively learn from models
that trained on the new task and iteratively rec-
ommend better models. Although meta-learning
approaches are vastly different, we discuss them
in a general form by considering a general setting
using meta-data and meta-learners.
An interesting question is whether meta-
learners are vulnerable to any attack. This is not a
trivial question, and we have not found any paper
regarding meta-learning security. Evasion attack
does not seem to be applicable for meta-learning
because meta-learners are basically used to train
a new model on a new task in an internal training
process within a company. In other words, an
attacker does not even have an access to the
black-box meta-learner to send query to. Even if
the attacker hypothetically has an access to the
meta-learner, what she can do heavily depends on
the meta-learner structure, algorithm, and how it
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works. Hence, it might be possible to perform an
evasion attack on specific meta-learners with a set
of non-restrictive assumptions, but it needs more
investigation and research.
Data poisoning attack, on the other hand,
seems feasible. Here, the attacker should inject
a set of meta-data points, not just data points.
However, the process of crafting and injecting
meta-data point is trickier than data points. In
general, data poisoning attack can have two aims:
1) halting or degrading learning process, or 2)
creating a backdoor for later use. For the first
purpose, the attacker can upload several datasets
and models publicly that show good performance,
but they do not have suitable model architecture
or parameters for the new task meta-learner aims
to learn. Although it can slow down the learning
process, a good meta-learning strategy should
easily defeat this attack by exploring other model
architectures and parameters.
Creating a backdoor attack on the meta-
learner alone might not be very interesting to an
attacker. The reason is that the attacker probably
cannot have access to the mete-learner, as we
discussed earlier. Hence, it cannot simply use
the backdoor. A more sophisticated and practical
attack is to first create a model with a backdoor
that achieves a good performance on a task that
is not far from the new task meta-learner wants to
learn. At the second step, the attacker can force
the model to choose his backdoored model, for
example as a pre-trained model in the context of
transfer learning, by launching data poisoning on
the meta-learner. The practicality of such attacks
and how to defeat them needs further investiga-
tion.
Lifelong Machine Learning
Although lifelong machine learning has been
studied for a long time, the security aspect of it
has not been comprehensively studied. The reason
is that lifelong machine learning is far from being
solved and it is still an active area of research.
There are a plethora of models and system de-
signs about lifelong machine learning which is
out of the scope of this short overview. Here,
we only focus on potential security vulnerabilities
that a general lifelong learning may have. Each
specific lifelong learning model may suffer from
additional vulnerabilities, but we only consider
general case due to the lack of space.
Two concepts are highly associated with life-
long learning: 1) the assumption that the pre-
vious knowledge is available and it is used to
learn new tasks and 2) the sub-goal of prevent-
ing catastrophic forgetting. The first assumption
enables potential data poisoning, backdoor, and
exploratory attacks. The second goal provides
a new attack target that aims to break lifelong
learning by preventing the system from retaining
previous knowledge and tasks, which is an attack
on availability.
The study of how backdoor and data poison-
ing attacks can affect lifelong learning systems is
of paramount importance. For example, if a solu-
tion manages to tackle catastrophic forgetting, is
it possible for an attacker to create a backdoor on
one task and use it on all other newer tasks? If
possible, it has a disastrous security consequence
where all tasks are vulnerable.
It is also possible to jeopardize the second
sub-goal, i.e. solving catastrophic forgetting. One
interesting approach is to study whether adding
a few carefully crafted training samples, with
correct labels with respect to the new task, can
change the structure of the model such that it
performs poorly on older tasks. An attacker can
potentially formulate an optimization problem
where the goal is to change the manifold of the
old task dramatically while the label is correct
with respect to the new task. The attack and de-
fense mechanisms specific to the lifelong learning
need more research.
CONCLUSION
The adaptation of different machine learning
methodologies has significantly growth recently
and their security vulnerabilities should be stud-
ied comprehensively. In this article, we briefly
introduce several widely-used machine learning
methodologies and discuss their potential secu-
rity vulnerabilities and challenges. We note that
the security aspects of certain machine learning
methodologies are open research questions that
call for further investigation. We hope that this
article enlighten the machine learning commu-
nity about the potential security vulnerabilities
of these methodologies and encourage more re-
search to prevent any backlash as a result of
security breakdown.
10 IT Professional
REFERENCES
1. Y. Zhao, I. Shumailov, R. Mullins, and R. Anderson, “To
compress or not to compress: Understanding the inter-
actions between adversarial attacks and neural network
compression,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1810.00208, 2018.
2. Y. Ji, X. Zhang, S. Ji, X. Luo, and T. Wang, “Model-reuse
attacks on deep learning systems,” in Proceedings of
the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and
Communications Security. ACM, 2018, pp. 349–363.
3. B. Wang, Y. Yao, B. Viswanath, H. Zheng, and B. Y. Zhao,
“With great training comes great vulnerability: practical
attacks against transfer learning,” in 27th {USENIX}
Security Symposium ({USENIX} Security 18), 2018, pp.
1281–1297.
4. S. Rezaei and X. Liu, “A target-agnostic attack on deep
models: Exploiting security vulnerabilities of transfer
learning,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1904.04334, 2019.
5. E. Bagdasaryan, A. Veit, Y. Hua, D. Estrin, and
V. Shmatikov, “How to backdoor federated learning,”
arXiv preprint arXiv:1807.00459, 2018.
6. Y. Aono, T. Hayashi, L. Wang, and S. Moriai,“ Privacy-
preserving deep learning: Revisited and enhanced,” in In-
ternational Conference on Applications and Techniques
in Information Security, 2017, pp. 100–110.
7. K. Bonawitz, V. Ivanov, B. Kreuter, A. Marcedone,
H.B. McMahan, S. Patel, R. Daniel, A. Aaron, and
K. Seth,“ Practical secure aggregation for privacy-
preserving machine learning,” in Proceedings of the
2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Com-
munications Security, 2017, pp. 1175–1191.
8. R.C. Geyer, T. Klein, and M. Nabi, “Differentially pri-
vate federated learning: A client level perspective,” arXiv
preprint arXiv:1712.07557, 2017.
9. D. Yin, Y. Chen, K. Ramchandran, and P. Bartlett,
“Byzantine-robust distributed learning: Towards optimal
statistical rates,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1803.01498, 2018.
10. P. Blanchard, R. Guerraoui, J. Stainer et al., “Machine
learning with adversaries: Byzantine tolerant gradient
descent,” in Advances in Neural Information Processing
Systems, 2017, pp. 119–129.
11. R. Bost, R.A. Popa, S. Tu, and S. Goldwasser, “Machine
learning classification over encrypted data,” in NDSS,
2015.
12. N. Carlini, C. Liu, U. Erlingsson, J. Kos, and D. Song,
“The Secret Sharer: Evaluating and testing unintended
memorization in neural networks,” in 28th USENIX Se-
curity Symposium (USENIX Security 19), 2019, pp. 267–
284.
13. Y. Aono, T. Hayashi, L. Wang, and S. Moriai, “ Privacy-
preserving deep learning: Revisited and enhanced,” in In-
ternational Conference on Applications and Techniques
in Information Security, 2017, pp. 100–110.
14. B. Hitaj, G. Ateniese, and F. Perez-Cruz, “ Deep models
under the GAN: information leakage from collaborative
deep learning,” in Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC
Conference on Computer and Communications Security,
2017 pp. 603–618.
15. Y. Long, V. Bindschaedler, L. Wang, D. Bu, X. Wang,
H. Tang, C.A. Gunter, and K. Chen, “Understanding
membership inferences on well-generalized learning
models,” arXiv preprint arXiv:1802.04889, 2018.
Shahbaz Rezaei received his M.S. degree in infor-
mation technology from the Sharif University of Tech-
nology, Tehran, Iran, in 2013. His research interests
include machine learning security, machine learning
application, deep reinforcement learning, and com-
puter networks. He is currently a Ph.D. student at UC
Davis. Contact him at srezaei@ucdavis.edu.
Xin Liu received her Ph.D. degree from Purdue
University in 2002. She is currently a professor in
the Computer Science Department, University of Cal-
ifornia, Davis. Her current research focuses on data-
driven approach in networking (i.e., using and devel-
oping machine learning and optimization techniques
for network control and management). She is an IEEE
Fellow. Contact her at xinliu@ucdavis.edu.
May/June 2019 11
